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DEVELOPMENT DECISION-MAKING AND 
THE CONTENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT LAW 
DANIEL D. BRADLOW* 
Abstract: International development law deals with the rights and duties 
of states and other actors in the development process. As the consensus 
view of the development process disintegrated during the 1970s and 
1980s, the agreement on the content of international development law 
also began to break down. Today there are two competing idealized views 
of development. The first, the "traditional view," maintains that devel-
opment is about economic growth, which can be distinguished from 
other social, cultural, environmental, and political development issues in 
society. The second, the "modern view," maintains that development is an 
integrated process of change involving intertwined economic, social, 
cultural, political, and environmental dimensions. These two views of 
development lead to different perceptions of the substantiw content of 
development law, of the importance of sovereignty, and of the rela-
tionship between national and international law in the law applicable to 
development. 
INTRODUCTION 
International development law (IDL) is the branch of interna-
tional law dealing with the rights and responsibilities of states and 
other actors in the development process. This means that the content 
of IDL depends on one's understanding of the elements involved in 
the development process and, particularly, of the development deci-
sion-making process. By "development decision-making" I mean the 
way in which individuals, groups, and institutions decide to adopt 
policies and initiate and implement programs and projects that affect 
either their own or other people's social and physical environment. 
At this time, there is no general consensus on how the various 
aspects of development should be dealt with in development decision-
making. In fact, this is a hotly debated topic that underlies the dis-
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agreements between: (1) the various stakeholders in contentious de-
velopment projects and policies; (2) the international economic insti-
tutions and their critics; and (3) the different participants in the de-
bate over globalization.1 While there are many different views 
expressed in these debates, most views tend to cluster around two ide-
alized visions of development decision-making-the traditional view 
and the modern view. Part I of this Article briefly discusses the history 
of IDL. Part II focuses on these two idealized views of development 
decision-making and the different views of IDL that arise from each 
view. Finally, Part III considers likely future developments in our un-
derstanding of the content of IDL. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF IDL 
IDL began to emerge as a distinct body of law after World War II. 
It was inspired by Latin American dependency theorists2 and by the 
experience of the newly independent countries of Mrica and Asia, 
which discovered that despite their political independence, they were 
locked into unequal and unfavorable economic relations with their 
former colonial masters that constrained their ability to develop. 3 
Sympathetic legal commentators realized that the existing inter-
national legal order, like the existing economic order, worked to the 
disadvantage of these countries.4 They began to fashion legal argu-
ments, which were based on existing international legal doctrine, to 
support the goal of making the international economic order more 
1 See, e.g., Daniel D. Bradlow, The World Commission on Dams' Contribution to the Broader 
Debate on Development Decision-Making, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1531, 1532-35 (2001) [here-
inafter Bradlow, Dams Debate] (discussing the positions taken by the different sides in the de-
bates over dams and over globalization). 
2 See TED C. LEWELLEN, DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
THIRD WoRLD 60 (1995) (explaining that in the 1940s, economists from the United Na-
tions Economic Commission for Latin America developed dependency theory to explain 
underdevelopment, which they saw as being caused by unequal international economic ex-
changes). 
3 See, e.g., Samuel K.B. Asante, The Concept of Stability in Contractual Relations in the 
Transnational Investment Process, in LEGAL AsPECTS OF THE NEw INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC 
ORDER 234, 244 (Kamal Hossain ed., 1980) [hereinafter LEGAL AsPECTs] (noting that 
newly independent countries could not repudiate unfavorable agreements immediately 
upon political independence because of traditional doctrines such as pacta sunt servanda, 
sanctity of contract, acquired rights, and state succession). 
4 See, e.g., M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 348-49 
(1994) (explaining that foreign investors attempted to "internationalize" transnational 
investment agreements so that international legal doctrines like pacta sttnt servanda and 
minimum standards in the treatment of foreign investors would be applicable to their 
transactions). 
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equitable and to help developing countries gain greater control over 
their economic destinies.5 Their original focus was on the core issues 
of international economic law, namely international trade relations 
and a state's responsibilities towards its foreign investors and their 
home states. These efforts received international legal recognition in 
such documents as the United Nations Declaration on Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources6 and the arbitral awards made in 
the cases arising from the nationalization of the oil companies in the 
Middle East.7 Their legal arguments also influenced the negotiated 
compensation agreements that followed the nationalization of key 
natural resources and other corporate enterprises in developing 
countries8 and Part IV of the GATT, which allowed non-reciprocal 
trade benefits for developing countries.9 
However, these legal achievements resulted in only limited eco-
nomic success. By the mid-1970s, many developing countries still faced 
substantial barriers to development. Unfortunately, there was no 
agreement about what these barriers were or what the appropriate legal 
responses to them might be. Some commentators saw the problems as 
being imbedded in the structure of the international economic order, 
so they called for a New International Economic Order (NIE0).10 Oth-
5 See, e.g., Asante, supra note 3, at 242 (arguing that the application of the doctrine of 
pacta sunt servanda to transnational investment agreements should be effectively limited by 
the doctrine of clausula rebus sic stantibus under public international law). 
6 Declaration on the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A Res. 1803, U.N. 
GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. N5217 (1962); see also F.V. GARCIA-
AMADOR, THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAw OF DEVELOPMENT: A NEW DIMENSION OF IN-
TERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC LAw 132-40 (1990) (describing the evolution of the doctrine of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources). 
7 See, e.g., Kuwait v. Am. Indep. Oil. Co., 21I.L.M. 976, 1023 (Arb. Trib. 1982) (holding 
that stability clauses did not absolutely prohibit nationalization and that states may national-
ize foreign-owned property with payment of appropriate compensation); Saudi Arabia v. 
Aramco, 27 I.L.R. 117, 171-72 (Arb. Trib. 1958) (interpreting the concession agreements 
under Saudi Arabian law and using public international law to fill the gaps in the Saudi Ara-
bian law); N1co ScHRUVER, PERMANENT SoVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL REsouRcEs: BALANc-
ING RIGHTS AND DuTIES 175 (1997) (discussing concession agreements involving natural 
resources in Iran and Dubai); SoRNARAJAH, supra note 4, at 339-40 (explaining that the host 
country's law is generally regarded as applicable to the concession agreements in oil conces-
sion arbitrations). 
8 SoRNARAJAH, supra note 4, at 402-14 (discussing capital importing country ap-
proaches to compensation for expropriated property). 
9 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, pt. IV, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.AS. 
1700,55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
1° See Kamal Hossain et al., Introduction to LEGAL AsPECTS, supra note 3, at 1. Develop-
ing countries had articulated grievances with the prevailing economic order and at-
tempted to shape a new economic order since the 1950s. See id. The first attempt to intro-
duce a new economic order was made in 1952, when Chile raised this issue in terms of 
198 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 27:195 
ers, while not denying that there were problems with the international 
order, rejected these calls and argued that the problem was primarily 
caused by the economic and political policy choices of the developing 
countries themselves.ll During most of the 1970s and early 1980s, many 
IDL theorists and practitioners were focused on this debate over the 
need for a NIEO and its in ternationallegal implications. 
While those advocating a NIEO did have some legal success, 12 
they ultimately failed. The debt crisis of the 1980s eventually over-
whelmed demands for a NIEO. Thereafter, the attention of the inter-
national community shifted from the international economic order to 
the internal barriers to, and requirements for, development in indi-
vidual countries.I3 This change in focus has generated an intense on-
going debate about the nature of the development process and the 
barriers to development. This broader debate about development 
continues to affect IDL. Thus, one's understanding of the content of 
IDL depends on one's position in this broader development debate. 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources in discussions relating to the Draft Interna-
tional Covenant on Human Rights. See Milan Bulajic, Legal Aspects of a New International 
Economic Order, in LEGAL AsPECTS, supra note 3, at 45-46. Developing countries formally 
called for "a new international economic order" at the Non-Aligned Summit in 1973. See 
Hossain et al., supra, at 1. 
11 See, e.g., RAvi GuLHATI, EcoNOMIC DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE, THE PoLITICAL EcoN-
OMY OF REFORM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: REPORT OF THE WoRKSHOPS ON THE POLITICAL 
EcoNOMY OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND THE SusTAINABILITY oF REFoRM 3-4 (1986) 
(identifying "policy and institutional distortions" as one of the crucial factors in the African 
economic crisis); WoRLD BANK, SuB-SAHARAN AFRICA: fROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABLE 
GRoWTH 30 (1989) (discussing "deteriorating governance" as a factor behind the African 
economic decline). 
12 See, e.g., International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Dec-
ade, G.A. Res. 35/56, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 48, pmbl. para. 2, U.N. Doc. 
A35/48 (1981) [hereinafter International Development Strategy] (recognizing imbalances 
and inequities between developed and developing countries in the present system of in-
ternational economic relations and seeking to restructure the existing international eco-
nomic order); Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 
29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, pmbl., at 51, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975) [hereinafter U.N. Eco-
nomic Charter] (calling for the establishment of a NIEO designed to remove major hur-
dles to economic development in developing countries); Declaration on the Establishment of a 
New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess., Supp. No.1, 
at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974) [hereinafter U.N. Declaration on NIEO] (stating that 
Member States "shall correct inequalities and redress existing injustices" and "make it pos-
sible to eliminate the widening gap between the developed and the developing coun-
tries"). 
13 See, e.g., WoRLD BANK, supra note 11, at 23-30. 
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II. CoMPETING VIEWS oF DEVELOPMENT 
There was a time when there was a general consensus that devel-
opment was about economic growth,14 which, at least analytically, 
could be treated as a separate problem from other social, cultural, 
and political issues in society. Today, however, that consensus has bro-
ken down. The competing views of development now cluster around 
two distinct approaches. We can refer to these two views as "the tradi-
tional view" and the "modern view." 
The differences between these views of development revolve 
around a few key issues. The most relevant are: (1) the appropriate role 
and responsibilities of the state and the other actors15 in development 
decision-making; (2) whether development is primarily an economic 
process or is a holistic process of transformation; and (3) the relation-
ship between international and national regulation in the development 
process.16 
14 See, e.g.,jAMES WEAVER & KENNETH jAMESON, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: COMPETING 
PARADIGMS 7-11 (1981). In conventional neoclassical models, human welfare is measured 
by increases in consumption of goods and services. Id. Accordingly, the conventional lit-
erature on development economics focuses on removing barriers to economic growth. See, 
e.g., PIERRE-RICHARD AGENOR & PETER j. MONTIEL, DEVELOPMENT MACROECONOMICS 3 
(1996). This was reflected in international discourses regarding development. In 1961, the 
United Nations General Assembly adopted an economic growth rate of five percent in 
national income as a target for developing countries. United Nations Development Decade: A 
PTOgrammefor International Economic Co-operation (1), G.A. Res. 1710, U.N. GAOR 2d Comm., 
16th. Sess., 1084th plen. mtg. ~ 1 (1961). The Pearson Report noted that some had 
reached and even exceeded the target. LESTER B. PEARSON ET AL., PARTNERS IN DEVELOP-
MENT 28 (1970). 
15 This means that a key area of disagreement is the definition of the appropriate legal 
and other relationships between the following four groups of actors in development deci-
sion-making: 
• states, which approve development projects and make and implement develop-
ment policy; 
• project sponsors, which may be the private sector, the public sector, or the state 
itself; 
• project contractors, which include those public and private sector institutions 
that provide the financing, goods, and services for the design, construction, and 
operation of development projects and for the implementation of development 
policies; and 
• individuals and communities that are directly or indirectly affected, in both posi-
tive and negative ways, by particular policies and projects and their representa-
tives. 
See Bradlow, Dams Debate, supra note 1, at 1532-35. 
16 Many observers would consider that another key issue for developing countries is 
the existing arrangements for the governance of the international economic order. Since 
this issue relates primarily to the structure and functions of the international economic 
organizations and forums, it can be viewed more as a problem of international organiza-
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The two views of development, and their implications for IDL, are 
discussed below. As will be seen, one's conception of development 
influences one's understanding of the content of IDL in three ways. 
First, it shapes one's view of the substantive content of IDL. Second, it 
helps define one's view of the relationship between the sovereign and 
other actors in the development process. Third, it determines the de-
gree to which one views IDL as "international" law as opposed to 
"transnational" law. Each of these aspects of IDL will be considered 
separately. 
A. The Traditional View of Development 
Elements of the business community, governments, and interna-
tional organizations tend to support the traditional view. This approach 
assumes that development is primarily an economic process that con-
sists of discrete projects (e.g., building a dam, a road, a school, a fac-
tory, a mine, or a telecommunications system) and specific economic 
policies. It recognizes that development has social, environmental, and 
political implications but argues that these should be dealt with sepa-
rately from the economic aspects. 
The proponents of this view divide decision-making about these 
projects and policies into two parts. First, there are broad policy issues 
in which decisions are made through the political process by the gov-
ernment and society in which the policy or project will be imple-
mented. Examples of broad policy issues include: (1) whether the 
budget should allocate additional resources to health and education 
or to energy and national defense; (2) whether to build a system of 
highways or public transport; and (3) whether to promote export-
oriented or locally-focused industries. 
The second category involves specific project or policy decisions. 
Examples of these types of decisions include: (1) where a dam should 
be located and how it should be constructed, or (2) what exactly 
tions than of IDL. Therefore, it is treated as outside the scope of this Article. For more 
information on this issue, see Daniel D. Bradlow, Critical Issues Facing the Bretton Woods Sys-
tem: The World Bank, the IMF, and Human Rights, 6 ThANSNAT'L L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 47 
(1996); Daniel D. Bradlow, Should the International Financial Institutions Play a Role in the 
Implementation and Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law?, 50 U. KAN. L. REv. 695 
(2002); Daniel D. Bradlow, Stuffing New Wine Into Old Bottles: The Troubling Case of the IMF, 3 
]. OF INT'L BANKING REG. 9 (2001); Daniel D. Bradlow, "The Times They Are A-Changin": 
Some Preliminary Thoughts on Developing Countries, NGOs and the Reform of the WTO, 33 GEo. 
WAsH. INT'L L. REv. 503 (2001); Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being 
Propelled Towards a People-Centered Transnational Legal Order?, 9 AM. U.]. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 1 
(1993). 
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should be done to promote local industries. The responsibility of de-
cision-makers in this second category is to evaluate each project in 
terms of its technical, financial, and economic feasibility. As long as all 
technical problems can be resolved, the economic and financial 
benefits exceed its costs, and it is expected to produce the desired 
rate of return, a project is justified and is treated as developmentally 
beneficialP The decision-makers' remaining duty is to execute faith-
fully and efficiently their contractual obligations in regard to the pro-
ject. 
The traditional view allows the specific decision-makers to treat 
broad policy and other issues, particularly social and environmental 
issues, as externalities. These issues are perceived as the prerogative of 
the society or state in which the project is being built. 18 This means 
that the specific decision-maker's operating assumption is that the 
society or state in which the project is located will decide how it wishes 
to manage its own environment and to share the costs and benefits of 
the project among the various stakeholders. Specific decision-makers 
can treat these assumptions as background facts during the project 
negotiations and as fixed variables in their own planning. 
To the extent that various other project stakeholders wish to be 
involved in the project's broader decision-making process, they will 
need to consult with the government because it has decision-making 
authority over the broad social, political, environmental, and cultural 
implications of the project. They will only need to consult with 
specific decision-makers if they are interested in technical issues re-
lated to the design, construction, or operation of the project. 
While specific decision-makers may feel the need to consult with 
others before making any particular project decision, the range of 
people with whom they need to consult is limited. Because they are 
only responsible for technical and financial issues, they only need to 
17 See generally WARREN C. BAUM & STOKES M. TOLBERT, INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: 
LESSONS OF WORLD BANK EXPERIENCE 418-68 (1985) (discussing factors to be considered 
in project cost-benefit analysis). 
18 This view is reflected in a number of official documents. See, e.g., Articles of Agree-
ment of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, July 22, 1944, art. 
IV,§ 10, 60 Stat. 1440 ("The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs 
of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of 
the member or members concerned."), available at http:/ /www.worldbank.org; ORGANI-
ZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, art. II, para. 11 (2000), available at http:/ /www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf (advising multinational enterprises to "[a)bstain from any 
improper involvement in local political activities.") [hereinafter OECD GUIDELINES). 
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consult with experts on these issues before making their decisions. 
The only aspects of a project that would require a broader consulta-
tive process involve issues regarding the social and environmental ex-
ternalities that are the responsibility of the government and not the 
specific decision-makers. 
Decision-making under the traditional view is likely to be "top-
down." This makes it easy to identify to whom the different participants 
in the project are accountable. Project sponsors and contractors are 
only accountable to three groups: (1) government regulators for their 
compliance with the applicable regulations; (2) those who hired them 
for the performance of their contractual obligations; and (3) their 
owners or shareholders for their management of the enterprise.19 
Specific decision-makers will only be accountable to those ad-
versely affected by their decisions in the following two situations: (1) 
when they have a direct contractual relationship with persons and 
have failed to perform their contractual obligations, and (2) when the 
sponsors or contractors have committed a tort against these other 
stakeholders. 
The state, as the party with decision-making responsibility for the 
broader social and environmental aspects of the project, is account-
able to the beneficiaries and those harmed by the project or policy. 
Accountability is imposed on the state through the political system 
and through whatever administrative or judicial procedures exist for 
private actors to challenge governmental decisions. 
Another consequence of the traditional view is that it places some 
constraints on the topics that are open for negotiation in any develop-
ment transaction. Because the broad social, political, and environ-
mental decisions are the prerogative of the state, they are outside the 
scope of the negotiations between the project or policy sponsor and the 
other specific decision-makers. These negotiators can treat the social, 
environmental, and political parameters of the project or policy as 
fixed, and the parties must negotiate the terms of their transaction 
within these parameters. In the case of foreign specific decision-
makers-foreign corporations, consultants, and financial institutions-
this process is consistent with their legal obligation to obey the law of 
their host state and to refrain from interfering in its internal affairs. 2° 
19 See HARRY G. HENN & jOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 717-43 (3d ed. 
1983) (describing the management structure of corporations and noting that the board of 
directors' primary obligation is to the corporation's shareholders). 
20 See, e.g., SoRNARAJAH, supra note 4, at 151-62 (explaining that the territoriality prin-
ciple provides the basis for the host state's jurisdiction over foreign investors). 
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B. The Traditional View of Development and IDL 
1. The Substantive Content ofiDL 
According to the traditional view of development, IDL focuses on 
international economic law issues. IDL addresses those legal aspects of 
international trade, finance, and investment that deal with the specific 
challenges facing developing countries. In other words, the traditional 
view of development conceives of IDL as the branch of international 
economic law that deals with the specific problems of developing coun-
tries.21 This means that the focus of IDL is on those aspects of interna-
tional trade, investment, and finance law of most interest to developing 
countries. 
While there may be general agreement among all proponents of 
the traditional view about the types of issues addressed by IDL, there 
is disagreement about the actual doctrines that form its content. 
These differences of opinion reflect the different perceptions of the 
proponents and opponents of the NIEO. 
The NIEO had a number of objectives. It sought to: 
(1) ensure that each state could control economic activity within its 
own borders; 
(2) provide developing countries with more stable incomes for their 
primary commodity exports and greater assured access to tech-
nology, international finance, and investment; 
(3) enhance the role of developing countries in the governance of 
the international economy by promoting the United Nations as 
the forum for discussion of development issues; and 
(4) impose new obligations on the capital exporting countries to act 
in solidarity with developing countries.22 
The opponents of the NIEO contend that IDL should not create 
special rights for some states and special responsibilities for other 
states.23 They maintain that, at least from a legal perspective, all states 
21 See F.V. GARCIA-AMADOR, supra note 6, at 35-36 (identifying two basic elements of IDL 
as being the states' duties and responsibilities to cooperate for development and rights in 
development, including preferential treatments in trade and development assistance); AsiF 
H. QuRESHI, INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC LAw 338 (1999) (noting that IDL deals with an area 
of international economic law that can be a matter of controversy between developing and 
developed countries). 
22 See, e.g., WoRLD BANK, supra note 11, at 23-30. See generally GARCIA-AMADOR, supra 
note 6. 
25 See Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 16, at 12-14. 
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are equal and their rights and duties do not vary according to their 
level of development. These NIEO opponents add that this legal 
equality does not preclude states from voluntarily agreeing to assume 
different obligations depending on their level of development.24 The 
position of the opponents is that IDL should be seen as merely the 
part of international economic law that deals with the international 
economic relations of developing countries.25 
2. Sovereignty and IDL 
The proponents and opponents of the NIEO agree that the state 
is the key subject of IDL. Both are concerned with the rights and du-
ties of states and attach great importance to the concept of state sov-
ereignty. This agreement over the importance of sovereignty is not 
surprising given that its proponents are primarily motivated by their 
interest in achieving economic independence or self-determination 
for the developing countries. Similarly, its opponents base their posi-
tion on classical principles of international law, of which the state is 
the key subject.26 Consequently, they share their opponents' interest 
in upholding the principle of state sovereignty. One example of their 
shared concern with state sovereignty is that both acknowledge the 
significance of the principles of a state's permanent sovereignty over 
its natural resources and self-determination.27 
The importance both sides attach to state sovereignty is consis-
tent with their adherence to the traditional view's contention that a 
sovereign state retains final decision-making authority over the non-
economic aspects of development. However, while both sides recog-
nize that a sovereign state should have substantial influence over the 
24 Examples of obligations that wealthier countries have voluntarily assumed with re-
spect to poorer countries are generalized systems of preferences and foreign aid programs, 
such as the U.S. GSP Program and the Millennium Challenge Account. See also GARCIA-
AMADOR, supra note 6. 
25 For a discussion of opposing views on NIEO, see generally LEGAL AsPECTS, supra 
note 3. 
26 See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 
1990) (identifying the principles of the sovereignty and equality of states as the fundamen-
tal doctrine of the law of nations). 
27 See Bulajic, supra note 10, at 262--63 (noting that the right to economic self-
determination and permanent sovereignty over natural resources is regarded as funda-
mental in international law and that the principle of sovereign equality in states' economic 
relations emanates from and is applied to the right to self-determination without contro-
versy); see also sources cited supra note 6 (referring to the Declaration on the Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources and its evolution from the principle of self-
determination). 
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economic aspects of development, they disagree about the extent of 
that influence. Proponents of the NIEO argue that under interna-
tional law the sovereign has almost plenary powers, 28 while opponents 
contend that international law imposes certain constraints on the 
state's economic power.29 
The two sides also differ on the relative weight they assign to state 
sovereignty in their economic relationships with private actors. The 
proponents of the NIEO believe that state sovereignty is the most im-
portant legal protection that economically and politically weak devel-
oping countries have against undue interference by the richer North-
ern countries. Thus, these proponents insist on the state's ability to 
submit all economic activity within its borders to its exclusive jurisdic-
tion. This can be seen, for example, in their advocacy of compulsory 
licenses and in their view that compensation for nationalized property 
need only be appropriate under the circumstances and should be de-
termined by the domestic law of the host state.3o 
However, the opponents of the NIEO argue that there are certain 
international legal standards that constrain the state's ability to treat 
foreign property owners in any way that it wishes.31 Moreover, they 
28 See Report of the Secretariat on the Outstanding Issues in the Draft Code of Conduct on 
Transnational Corporations, U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc 
E/C.10/1984/S/5 (1984), 1-eprinted in 23 I.L.M. 602 (1984) [hereinafter UNCTC Report] 
(reporting that proponents considered the principle of permanent sovereignty over natu-
ral resources and economic activities well-recognized in international law and U.N. resolu-
tions); Elsa Kelly, 'National Treatment' and the Formulation of a Code of Conduct for Transna-
tional Corporations, in LEGAL AsPECTS, supra note 3, at 148-52 (examining developing 
countries' attempt to ensure states' power over transnational corporations, including "full 
exercise by the host country of its permanent sovereignty over all its wealth, natural re-
sources and economic activities"). 
29 See UNCTC Report, supra note 28 (stating that some States insisted on including a 
reference to international law in paragraph 6 of the Draft Code on Transnational Corpora-
tions to qualify the States' sovereign power over foreign investors). 
80 See also SoRNARAJAH, supra note 4, at 402-1,4; S.R. Chowdhury, Legal Aspects of the 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, in LEGAL AsPECTS, supra note 3, at 88 (discuss-
ing developing countries' rejections of independent international tribunals to resolve in-
vestment disputes); Kelly, supra note 28, at 143-44 (explaining that, from the perspective 
of developing countries, Article 2.2 of the U.N. Economic Charter is regarded as uphold-
ing a principle of appropriate compensation under the domestic law of the expropriating 
state). 
5I The opponents' position is reflected, for example, in the following provisions of the 
OECD Guidelines: (1) "Governments have the right to prescribe the conditions under 
which multinational enterprises operate within their jurisdictions, subject to international 
law." OECD GuiDELINES, supra note 18, art I. 17, and (2) "Governments adhering to the 
Guidelines set them forth with the understanding that they will fulfil [sic] their responsi-
bilities to treat enterprises equitably and in accordance with international law and with 
their contractual obligations," id. art. I, 8. See also Bulajic, supra note 10, at 230-31 (noting 
206 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 27:195 
deny that sovereignty can shield the state from all outside interven-
tion in its internal economic affairs. Whenever the state treats foreign 
investors in ways that are incompatible with international legal stan-
dards, other states may demand compensation for the injury to their 
nationals and seek to hold the state accountable for its actions.32 
The opponents also disagree with the proponents of the NIEO 
over the validity of taking the level of a state's development into ac-
count when deciding on its rights and responsibilities. The opponents 
argue that all states are equal and should be treated equally. Addi-
tionally, they argue that the level of a state's development is not rele-
vant to its status as a sovereign state under international law. Fur-
thermore, they contend that justice requires that all states be treated 
equally, so that the same rules should apply in the same way to all 
states. This position is consistent with the basic international legal 
principle that all states are, formally, co-equal sovereign states.33 
The proponents, on the other hand, argue that, in fact, all states 
are not equal and that the application of the same pre-NIEO interna-
tional legal standards to two countries at different levels of develop-
ment will produce very different results. Consequently, they advocate 
that justice requires the law to account explicitly for the differences in 
situations of countries, which inevitably leads to developing countries 
obtaining more favorable treatment.34 
3. The Relationship Between National and International Law 
The adherents of traditional IDL draw a sharp distinction be-
tween national and international development law. For them, IDL 
opponents' adherence to certain minimum international standards in treating foreign 
investors and their properties). 
s2 See, e.g., SoRNARAJAH, sufrra note 4. 
33 See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 26; Grossman & Bradlow, sufrra note 16, at 1 (stat-
ing that international law has traditionally viewed states as co-equal autonomous actors); 
see also OECD, Declaration by the Governments of OECD Member Countries and Decisions of the 
OECD Council on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, in INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT t 11.1 (rev. ed. 1984) (declaring that Member States should give another 
Member State or its nationals "national treatment," which is "consistent with international 
law and no less favorable than that accorded in like situations to domestic enterprises"). 
The Declaration further states "[t]hat Member countries will consider applying "national 
treatment" in respect of countries other than Member countries." Id. t 11.2. 
34 See Hossain et al., sufrra note 10, at 5-6 (stating that in NIEO instruments, develop-
ing countries attempt to seek legal protection from coercive forces and affirmative action 
to remedy prior disadvantageous conditions); Kelly, sufrra note 28, at 150 (explaining that 
from developing countries' standpoint, states may give preferential treatment to their na-
tionals in seeking to achieve certain national economic and developmental goals). 
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deals with the international economic relations of developing states, 
and national development law includes these aspects of the law that 
deal with the social, economic, environmental, and political aspects of 
development. 35 
C. The Modern View of Development 
The modern view of development tends to be held by non-
governmental organizations, civic organizations, and progressive ele-
ments in governments, corporations, and international organizations. 
It posits that the economic aspects of development cannot be sepa-
rated from its social, political, environmental, and cultural aspects 
and that development should be seen as a holistic, integrated proc-
ess.36 From this perspective, development projects and policies should 
be treated not so much as discrete economic events but as episodes of 
social, economic, and environmental transformation that are part of 
an ongoing process of change. This means, for example, that to fully 
assess the desirability of a particular project proposal it is necessary to 
account for all the ways that the project or policy will affect its social 
and physical environment and how these impacts will evolve over the 
life cycle of the project. Without all this information the decision-
makers cannot be confident that they understand the economic, 
financial, environmental, social, cultural, and political consequences 
of their decisions. They also cannot accurately assess the costs and 
benefits of any proposed project or policy, thereby increasing the risk 
that they will approve projects or policies that will produce less 
benefits and cause more harm than expected. 
The modern view of development has evolved in response to the 
mounting empirical evidence that, in too many cases, governments 
and project sponsors mistakenly followed policies and constructed 
(and continue to construct) developmentally harmful projects.37 It is 
also, in part, a consequence of two other factors in human affairs.38 
!15 See generally sources cited supra notes 20-21. 
36 See generally Bradlow, Dams Debate, supra note 1 and sources cited therein (discussing 
multidimensionality of development in the modern view). 
37 See, e.g., RAYMOND F. MIKESELL & URRY WILLIAMS, INTERNATIONAL BANKS AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT (1992) (discussing several case studies in which poor assessments of pro-
jects costs have resulted in excessive environmental costs). 
36 A third important factor is improvement in information and communication tech-
nology. This technology enables business, investors, and NGOs around the world to 
quickly learn about and react to developments around the world. See, e.g., Grossman & 
Bradlow, supra note 16, at 11. This factor receives less attention in this Article because, to 
date, it has had less direct impact on IDL than the other two. 
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The first is our growing recognition of the limits on the ability of the 
environment to maintain the human societies that we have created 
and the resulting importance attached to accounting adequately for 
the environmental impacts of development activity.39 The second fac-
tor is the increasing influence of international human rights law and 
forums around the world. The evolution of international human 
rights law and the establishment of forums in which to enforce this 
law4° have educated governments and international organizations 
about their responsibilities towards those individuals affected by their 
actions. It has also raised awareness among people about their rights 
and increased their willingness to take steps t{) oppose development 
projects and policies that they believe will harm them. 
There are several consequences that follow from this view of de-
velopment, which can be seen most clearly in the case of projects. 
First, development decision-makers have greater and more complex 
responsibilities than those assigned to them by the proponents of the 
traditional view of development. According to the modern view of de-
velopment, these decision-makers are responsible both for the per-
formance of their specific project functions and for the impact of 
these functions on the other stakeholders in the project and on the 
project's physical environment. This means that it is no longer seen as 
acceptable for them to treat social and environmental costs as exter-
nalities. They are now expected to internalize these costs and account 
for them in their project planning. It is thus not prudent, in an eco-
nomic or risk management sense, for project decision-makers to rely 
on government decisions relating to environmental and social matters 
without making their own independent assessment of these matters. 
Second, the proponents of this view of development attach great 
importance to consultations between project decision-makers and all 
those who will be affected by the proposed project. The reason is that 
the project decision-makers can only be confident that they have ac-
curately assessed the costs and benefits of the project if they under-
stand how those who will be affected by it will react to the resulting 
changes in their social and physical environment. This information 
can only be uncovered through consultation with all parties that will 
39 See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, at V-Vi 
(1998) (noting that "human economic activity threatens to surpass the ecological limits of 
the biosphere (if it has not already done so in certain instances)"). 
40 See generally GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (Hurst Hannum ed., 3d ed. 
1999) (describing the different international forums in which human rights cases are ad-
dressed). 
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be affected by the project or with those having the ability to influence 
how the affected parties will respond. 
The emphasis on consultations has two important implications. 
First, the consultation process can only produce the desired result if 
the project decision-makers provide the affected people with ade-
quate information about the project. Unless these people have 
sufficient information to understand the project's potential impact, 
they cannot know with any confidence how they will respond. The 
need for consultation, therefore, necessarily leads to a demand for 
disclosure of information.41 
Another implication is that consultations inevitably politicize the 
project because both the disclosure of information and the actual 
consultations become part of the project sponsor's efforts to secure 
the affected stakeholders' support. If the affected people do not sup-
port the project, the project decision-makers cannot be confident that 
they will act in the best long-run interests of the project and that the 
project will be sufficiently sustainable to produce the expected devel-
opments. The modern view therefore highlights the need to consult 
groups traditionally excluded from power such as women and indige-
nous people. It also may require decision-makers to take a position on 
a domestic political issue. The result is that the consultation process 
becomes an important arena of contest between supporters and op-
ponents of the project. 
The modern view of development requires a more participatory 
form of decision-making than the traditional view. This means that 
project decision-makers, who insist on a top-down form of decision-
making, are unlikely to obtain all the information they need to antici-
pate and assess all project impacts.42 
Another consequence of the modern view of development is that it 
has begun to blur the boundaries of the scope of the project sponsors' 
or contractors' responsibility. The modern view requires all project 
sponsors and contractors to take into account the impact of the project 
41 See generally jACKSON B. BATrLE ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING: NEPA 
AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES AcT (2d ed. 1994) (describing the need for adequate in-
formation and consultation in environmental decision-making). 
42 See, e.g., WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK PARTICIPATION SOURCEBOOK 3-4 (1996), 
available at http:/ /www.worldbank.org/wbi/sourcebook/sbhome.htm. The Bank currendy 
advocates stakeholder participation that involves all parties concerned, such as the poor 
and socially disadvantaged, NGOs, private sector organizations, local and national gov-
ernment officials, and Bank staff. See id. at 6-7. For examples of participatory develop-
ment, see id. at 17-120 (reviewing development projects with participatory approaches in 
fifteen countries). 
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and how it will evolve over the life cycle of the project. Since all aspects 
of the project are seen as interconnected, the sponsors and contractors 
cannot easily divide responsibility amongst themselves. This intercon-
nection makes it harder to identify the geographic or temporal limits of 
their responsibility. In fact, under the modern vision of development, 
any attempt to draw boundaries around the project sponsors' and con-
tractors' responsibilities is a question of judgment, which requires de-
bate and consultation. 
The case of a dam illustrates the significance of the difference in 
perceptions of responsibility between the two views of development 
decision-making. Under the traditional view of development, the 
scope of the specific decision-makers' responsibility is limited to their 
direct contributions to the dam itself and its immediately surrounding 
areas. The duration of their responsibilities is limited to the time of 
their involvement in the dam project and for a defined period there-
after. On the other hand, the modern view holds the dam's decision-
makers responsible for the dam's social, economic, cultural, political, 
and environmental impact on the whole river basin-and all who de-
pend on it-and for the duration of the dam's construction, opera-
tion, and decommissioning. Their responsibility may also continue 
during the period in which the environment and the affected people 
adapt to the decommissioning of the dam. 
The modern view does not show the same respect for the concept 
of sovereignty as the traditional view. According to the modern con-
cept of development, the sovereign is only one actor in the develop-
ment drama, and there is no clear justification for international or-
ganizations, foreign corporations, financial institutions, and NGOs to 
give its opinions greater weight than those of other actors. In fact, the 
case for deferring to the sovereign's opinions is particularly weak 
when these opinions conflict with the expressed interests of those who 
will be most directly affected by the project. 
D. The Modern View of Development and IDL 
1. The Substantive Content ofiDL 
The modern view of the substantive content of IDL differs in two 
important ways from the traditional view. The first is that modern IDL 
is as concerned with the legal rules and procedures that result in de-
velopment policies and projects that are economically, environmen-
tally, socially, and legally sustainable as it is with the rights and respon-
sibilities of the developing and industrialized states towards each 
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other and to other actors in the international economy. Thus, the 
modern IDL view treats the state as only one of many actors in the 
development process. This can be seen, for example, in the Declara-
tion on the Right to Development (DRD), which is an important 
document for modern IDL.43 
The second difference is that for the proponents of the modern 
view, the substantive content of IDL includes not only traditional, in-
ternational economic law issues, but also those international envi-
ronmental and human rights law principles and documents that are 
relevant to its holistic view of the development process. Thus, the 
proponents consider the following as part of IDL: the Universal Dec-
laration on Human Rights,44 the major United Nations Human Rights 
Conventions,45 the DRD, the Stockholm Declaration,46 the Rio Decla-
ration on Environment and Development (the Rio Declaration),47 
and such key multilateral environmental agreements as the climate 
change and biodiversity conventions.48 
The modern view's expansion of the scope of IDL does not imply 
any diminution in the importance of the international economic law 
issues that are at the core of the traditional view of IDL. Instead, this 
expansion should be seen as an effort to change the content of appli-
cable international economic law principles. For example, under the 
43 Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., 
Supp. No. 53, at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/128 (1986) ("All human beings have a responsibility 
for development, individually and collectively, taking into account the need for full respect 
for their human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as their duties to the commu-
nity."). 
44 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 
71 (1948). 
45 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1456 [hereinafter 
CRC]; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
openedforsignatureMar. 1,1980,19 I.L.M. 33 (1980) [hereinafter CEDAW]; International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 
660 U.N.T.S. 195; see also Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. World Confer-
ence on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.l57/24, pt. 1 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 
1661 (1993). 
46 Declaration of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972, 
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/14, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972). 
47 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, U.N. Conference 
on Environment and Development, Doc. A/CONF.l5l/5/Rev. 1, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 
(1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. 
48 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 
849 (1992) [hereinafter Climate Change Convention]; Convention on Biological Diversity, 
June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992) [hereinafter Biodiversity Convention]. 
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traditional view of IDL, the primary obligation of a foreign investor is 
always to act in conformity with the law of the host state. 49 Under the 
modern view, the foreign investor may be required to act in confor-
mity with the "best international practices" in the industry, even if 
these standards exceed or contradict those stipulated in the law of the 
host state. 5° 
2. Sovereignty and IDL 
The modern approach to IDL acknowledges the importance of 
sovereignty but adopts a narrow interpretation. In fact, this approach, 
with its holistic view of development, views very few issues as being 
within a sovereign state's exclusive jurisdiction.51 Its view of sover-
eignty is derived from its concern with human rights and environ-
mental issues.52 The practical effect of modern IDL's limited view of 
exclusive sovereign jurisdiction can be seen, for example, in the ef-
forts of the international community to deny financing to projects, 
such as the Sardar Sarovar dam in India53 and the Ilisu dam in Tur-
49 See, e.g., OECD GuiDELINES, supra note 18. 
so See, e.g., Bradlow, Dams Debate, supra note 1. 
51 See generally INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW WITH A HUMAN RIGHTS FACE (Friedl 
Weiss eta!. eds., 1998) [hereinafter IEL WITH A HuMAN RIGHTS FAcE]. 
52 See Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 43, art. 6.1 (stipulating States' 
duty to cooperate in promoting universal human rights "without any distinction as to race, 
sex, language or religion"). There are specific U.N. conventions that cover human rights 
of women, see generally CEDAW, supra note 45, and children, see generally CRC, supra note 
45. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights has also created a Draft United Nations Dec-
laration on The Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 34 I.L.M. 541,546 (1995). For child labor, 
see International Labor Organization Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Imme-
diate Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor, June 17, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 1207. In 
addition to these formal efforts, international civil society has reacted to business practices 
that fail to incorporate human rights considerations. See, e.g., Peter Malanczuk, Globaliza-
tion and the Future Role of Sovereign States, in IEL WITH A HuMAN RIGHTS FAcE, supra note 51, 
at 58-59 (giving examples of international protests against Shell for disregard of human 
rights of minority rights activists in Nigeria and against Nike for unfair labor practices in-
cluding use of child labor in developing countries); see also Grossman & Bradlow, supra 
note 16, at 3 (explaining that the United Nations' recognition of protection of human 
rights as an international obligation provides the basis of international organizational su-
pervision over human rights). 
55 In 1992, in reaction to strong international criticism against the Sardar Sarovar pro-
ject, the World Bank conducted a review and imposed conditionality on the remaining 
loan to ensure adequate resettlement and economic rehabilitation of the affected people 
and environmental protection. In 1993, the Bank formally canceled the remaining loan. 
See World Bank, Operations Evaluation Dep't, Learning from Narmada, Precis No. 88, at 
http:/ /wbln0018.worldbank.org/ oed/ oeddoclib.nsf/ e90210£184a4481 b85256885007bl72 
4/12a795722ea20£6e852567£5005d8933 (May 1, 1995). For a detailed review of the Sardar 
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key,54 that are seen as impairing the human rights of those adversely 
affected by these projects. It can also be discerned in the approach of 
the Bretton Woods Institutions to good governance, in environmental 
matters, and in the debates in the wro over labor rights. 55 
It is important to recognize that modern IDL's narrow approach to 
sovereignty also applies to the international economic aspects of IDL. 
This necessarily follows from its holistic view of development, which 
means that IDL sees the environmental, human rights, and economic 
aspects of international transactions as being too intertwined to be 
treated separately.56 Thus, modern IDL does not see any subset of the 
issues relating to regulation of foreign investors as being exclusively 
within the jurisdiction of the host state. In this regard, it shares the view 
of the proponents of traditional IDL who contend that international 
law requires certain minimum standards in the treatment and behavior 
of foreign investors. However, the holders of the modern view of IDL 
differ from the traditionalists in their view of the contents of these 
standards. They argue that these standards address a broader range of 
issues than the state's treatment of foreign investors. From their per-
Sarovar Dam project, see BRADFORD MoRSE & THOMAS R. BERGER, SARDAR SAROVAR: THE 
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW (1992). 
54 The export credit agencies of developed countries refused to give export credit 
support unless Turkey satisfied four conditions designed to address international concerns 
about the project's adverse impacts on human rights and the environment. See]. McCrystie 
Adams, Comment, Environmental and Human Rights Objections Stall Turkey's Proposed Ilisu 
Dam, 2000 Cow.]. INT'L ENVTL. L. & PDL'v 173, 175-76 (2001). The conditions include 
the creation of an internationally acceptable resettlement plan, the establishment of an 
upstream water treatment plant, the maintenance of downstream water flow, and the pro-
tection of archeological sites. See id. at 176. 
55 See, e.g., PoL'v DEv. & REv. DEP'T, INT'L MoNETARY FuND, REVIEW OF THE FUND's Ex-
PERIENCE IN GovERNANCE IssuEs 5-9 (2001) (explaining that IMF regards good governance 
as an important condition to effectively attain the objectives of IMF-supported projects and 
promotes it through prior consultations with states seeking assistance), available at 
http:/ /www.imf.org/external/np/gov/2001/eng/gov.pdf. For details of World Bank's 
strategies regarding good governance through development assistance, see e.g., PovERTY 
REDUCTION & EcoN. MGMT. NETWORK, PUB. SECTOR GROUP, WoRLD BANK, REFORMING 
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS AND STRENGTHENING GOVERNANCE (2000), available at http:/ /wwwl. 
worldbank.org/ publicsector I civilservice/Reforming.pdf; see also Friedl Weiss, Internationally 
Recognized Labour Standards and Trade, in IEL WITH A HuMAN RIGHTS FAcE supra note 51, at 
79-81 (identifYing the use of trade sanctions against states that fail to protect labor rights as a 
key issue in debates on international trade and labor standards). 
56 See Rio Declaration, supra note 47, princ. 4 ("In order to achieve sustainable devel-
opment, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development 
process and cannot be considered in isolation from it."); U.N. Conference on Environ-
ment and Development, Agenda 21, 'll 23, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 151/26 (1992) ("Economic 
development, social development and environmental protection are interdependent and 
mutually reinforcing components of sustainable development."). 
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spective, these standards should address environmental and social is-
sues as well as economic issues such as the investor's responsibility to 
the host state and its citizens and the state's responsibility to the other 
stakeholders in the investment or business transaction. 
It is interesting to note that the modern view of IDL has an ex-
pansive view of the applicable regulatory framework for particular 
activities. The traditional view of IDL saw regulation as essentially a 
national function in which states would pass laws and regulations to 
govern particular forms of conduct in their jurisdictions. The modern 
view of IDL seems to see the "effective" regulatory framework for a 
particular sector as being derived from a greater variety of sources. 
The first, and still the most important, is the laws and regulations of 
the country in which the project is located. These will be supple-
mented by the international treaties to which that state is a signatory. 
In addition, project sponsors and contractors will need to refer to 
various sources that, while not binding or even directly applicable to 
the sponsor or contractor, give guidance on what constitutes best 
practice for the particular activity being undertaken by the sponsor or 
contractor. These sources include: international organizations such as 
the World Bank57 and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) ;58 
industry associations such as the International Organization for Stan-
dardization (ISO) ;59 and individual corporate codes of conduct.60 The 
57 See Gerhard Loibl, The World Bank Group and Sustainable Development, in IEL WITH A 
HuMAN RIGHTS FAcE, supra note 51, at 513, 520-26 (discussing the Bank's operational 
policies and procedures relevant to environmental protection and sustainable develop-
ment). For a comprehensive list of Bank's operational policies, see WoRLD BANK, OPERA-
TIONAL MANUAL, TABLE OF CONTENTS, http:/ /wbln0018.worldbank.org/institutional/ 
manuals/opmanual.nsf (last visited Apr. 16, 2004). 
58 For a list of relevant guidelines, see International Finance Corporation, Environ-
mental, Health and Safety Guidelines, at http:/ /www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/content/ 
EnvironmentalGuidelines (last visited Apr. 16, 2004). Projects supported by IFC are also 
subject to relevant parts of the Bank's Operational Manuals. See International Finance 
Corporation, Safeguard Policies (listing relevant Bank operational policies), at http:/ I 
ifclnl.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/Content/Safeguardpolicies (last visited Apr. 16, 2004). 
59 ISO introduced a series of quality management standards (ISO 9000). See Interna-
tional Organization for Standardization, ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 in Plain Language, at 
http:/ /www.iso.org/iso/en/iso9000-14000/basics/general/basics_4.html (last visited Apr. 
16, 2004). ISO has created a series of environmental management standards (ISO 14000) 
to address the following issues: environmental management systems, environmental audit-
ing and related investigations, environmental labels and declarations, environmental per-
formance evaluation, and life cycle assessment. See ISO, Technical Committee 207, What is 
ISO 14000?, at http:/ /www.tc207.org/faq.asp?Question=2 (last visited Apr. 16, 2004). 
60 See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co., Social Responsibility/Global Sourcing & Operating 
Guidelines, at http:/ /www.levistrauss.com/responsibility I conduct/ guidelines.htm (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2004) (outlining the corporate guidelines that take account of environ-
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sum of all these different sources can be considered the effective 
regulatory framework for a particular project, because actors who fail 
to act in conformity with the best practices established by this collec-
tion of laws, regulations, guidelines, and examples of good conduct 
risk incurring reputation and moral damages, if not legal liability.6I 
This framework informs the modern view of IDL's position on the 
rights and responsibilities of foreign investors and other actors in the 
development decision-making process. 
3. The Relationship Between National and International Law 
As we saw above, the traditional view of IDL is based on a strict de-
lineation between national and international law. In contrast, the mod-
ern approach to IDL focuses on transnational legal issues in which the 
boundary between national and international law is blurred and there 
is a dynamic interaction between these two bodies of law. 
III. THE CuRRENT STATE OF IDL AND ITs LIKELY FuTURE EvoLUTION 
There is a certain irony in the way IDL has evolved. Its early pro-
ponents were interested in helping developing countries strengthen 
their control over their economic futures. The proponents of the mod-
ern approach to IDL are in some ways working to undo the gains made 
by the traditional approach. While they recognize the importance of 
protecting state sovereignty in a world of economically and politically 
unequal states,62 they are also seeking to enhance the power of non-
state actors in the development process. 
ment, labor, and human rights issues in business partners and the host country); Nike, 
Compliance: Code of Conduct, at http:/ /www.nike.com/nikebiz/nikebizJhtml?page=25 
&cat=compliance&subcat=code.shtml (last updated Jan. 2004) (establishing minimum 
age limits for workers in its footwear (18 years) and apparel, accessories, and equipment 
businesses (16 years)); Shell Oil Co., Our Policy ~nd Principles, at http:/ /www.counton 
shell.com/welcome/policies/policies.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2004) (providing informa-
tion on Shell's corporate policy regarding business principles, health and environment, 
and sustainable development). 
61 Good examples of sectors where the regulatory framework has been effectively global-
ized are the hydro sector and the mining sector. See, e.g., WoRLD CoMMISSION oN DAMS, 
DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING (2000) http://www. 
dams.org/ I docs/ report/wcdreport. pdf. 
62 See Oscar Schachter, The Erosion of State Authority and Its Implications for Equitable Devel-
opment, in IEL WITH A HuMAN RIGHTS FACE, supra note 46, at 31, 43-44 (concluding that 
the present state-based structure still constitutes the general framework of governance in 
international relations but noting increasing influence of non-state actors); see also Rio 
Declaration, supra note 47, princ. 2 ("States have, in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their 
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In one important respect, the seeming incompatibility between 
these two approaches is more apparent than real. Both approaches 
share an interest in empowering the poorer and weaker actors in the 
international economic order. In addition, they are both interested in 
creating incentives for the richer and stronger actors to be more re-
sponsive to the needs of weaker stakeholders and to surrender some 
of their control over the international economic order. They differ, 
however, on whom should benefit from these efforts and whom 
should be targeted for help. The traditional approach sees the prob-
lem primarily in terms of states as beneficiaries and targets. The mod-
ern approach prefers to focus on individuals and communities as the 
beneficiaries and relatively powerful states, corporations, and interna-
tional organizations as the targets. 
The current global climate suggests that the future is likely to be 
more favorable to the modern approach than to the traditional ap-
proach for three reasons. First, the phenomenon of globalization is 
weakening the de facto control that states have over the economic and 
political affairs of their countries. It is also creating conditions that em-
power private non-state actors, both commercial enterprises and non-
governmental organizations representing civil society. This suggests 
that IDL principles that rely too heavily on exclusively state-based ap-
proaches to resolving development issues risk being overtaken by 
events. 
Second, there is growing concern around the world about envi-
ronmental issues and about the sustainability of our current approach 
to economic development. This suggests that approaches to IDL that 
do not take into account the need to promote environmental respon-
sibility and sustainable development are likely to be viewed as out of 
step with the needs of our time. 
Third, the dramatic developments in telecommunications that 
have taken place over the past twenty years make it increasingly difficult 
for key decision-makers to control the flow of information about their 
activities and, therefore, the responses to these activities. This means 
that states and large corporations cannot maintain exclusive control 
over those activities for which they are presumably responsible. This 
breakdown in control challenges legal thinkers to design new ap-
proaches to regulation and to holding actors accountable for the con-
own resources .... "); Climate Change Convention, supra note 48, pmbl. ("[r]eaffirming 
the principle of sovereignty of States in international cooperation to address climate 
change"). 
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sequences of their actions.63 Therefore, an approach to IDL that fo-
cuses too much on the state and its powers and responsibilities risks 
being found wanting in its proposed solutions to developmental prob-
lems. 
For these reasons it is likely that, in the future, legal thinkers and 
policy-makers will find the pure traditional approach to IDL unsatisfac-
tory. This does not mean, however, that a new consensus about the con-
tent of IDL and the best approach to IDL issues is likely to emerge in 
the short term. Such agreement is unlikely to appear in the absence of 
prior agreement on appropriate development decision-making. While 
most participants in the development process now accept that there are 
links between the economic, environmental, and social aspects of de-
velopment, they do not necessarily agree with the conclusions the 
modern view of development draws from this starting point. 
This suggests that the future debates about development and IDL 
will focus on what conclusions to draw from the intertwining of all 
aspects of development and the various legal consequences thereof. 
There will also be debates about how these issues should affect inter-
national trade and economic relations between developing countries 
and the former colonial powers and with international economic or-
ganizations. Consequently, it is safe to conclude that while the direc-
tion of the future evolution of IDL is clear, and the scope of its con-
tent is discernible, the precise contours and content of IDL are very 
hard to define and its evolution even harder to predict. The only 
thing that can be said with any confidence is that IDL will provide 
many interesting and important challenges for lawyers specializing in 
IDL for many years to come. 
63 See Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 16, at 12-14 (explaining that advances in in-
formation technology have enabled non-governmental actors to share information and 
spread activities across borders and thus undermine states' authority to regulate and sanc-
tion their activities). 
